The Use of the Tribunate for Reforms

Between the years 133 and 70 B.C.E., the tribunate was used by a number of men for reforms. These men were concerned for the future of Rome, as well as the welfare of the Roman people; the aims of their legislations and their actions reflected this. Because some of their proposed legislation circumvented the abuse of power by the Senate, and because some of their actions were contrary to tradition, they were perceived by the Senate as challenging its authority. This infuriated the Senate, which probably felt threatened and resorted to violence to dispose of these men. Consequently, Rome turned in against itself which eventually culminated in internal strife. Despite this, neither these tribunes themselves nor their actions can be said to be directly responsible for the ensuing civil wars. Instead, the reasons that Rome lapsed into civil war were the very same ones for the emergence of these tribune-reformers. Of these reasons, the most important is the inward-looking and conservative attitudes and policies of the influential group in the senate, who called themselves the "Optimates". Another was the inability of the plebeians to rise up to the responsibilities these tribunes had inevitably put into their hands. from http://janusquirinus.org/

The men who used the tribunate as the platform for reforms included the Gracchi brothers, Fulvius Flaccus, the younger Livius Drusus, Saturninus and Sulpicius Rufus. While the problems each addressed varied, they were invariably threats to the future and welfare of Rome, be it the poverty in the city, the abuse of senatorial power or the Italian problem. The solutions, though often enacted with infringements of senatorial authority or deviation from traditions, would have ameliorated the problems Rome faced, if embraced. Indeed, such improvements might have come about because these solutions infringed upon senatorial authority or deviated from tradition. This is probable considering that the main threat to the Roman republic was the conservative natures of the system and the people, particularly the Optimates. However, these tribunes were unlikely to have proposed or enacted such solutions with the primary purpose of challenging the Senate, even when they did have understandable reasons for bearing grudges against it. Instead, the solutions were for the benefit of Rome. from http://janusquirinus.org/

The Gracchi brothers are good examples of this. It is unlikely that Tiberius went outside the system because he was slighted by the Senate over the issue of Numantia, nor Gaius because he was avenging his brother or because he had been framed by the Senate. Instead, both were concerned with the poverty in the city of Rome, and, in different ways, tried their best at disinterested economic and social reforms. from http://janusquirinus.org/

Tiberius, observing the rural areas were deserted by Roman citizens but populated by servile workers, enacted his land reform, whereby each citizen was allotted a piece of public land for agriculture and excess land held by any citizen redistributed to other citizens.[1] This was an attempt to return the impoverished Roman plebeians to the land and to equalise land-ownership. When his land commission was thwarted by the Senate which refused financial support, Tiberius threatened to seized the property of Attaluseastern Mediterranean kingdom, which Attalus had bequeathed to the Romans when he died, to pay for the land settlement.[2] While Tiberius did bypass the Senate in enacting the agrarian law and snubbed them in the process, it is unlikely that he meant it as a challenge to their authority. Instead, it is conceivable that he felt that the land reform was too urgent to be delayed by senatorial discussion. This is especially likely in view of the hindrance to opposition from the Scipionic camp by the similar bill which C. Laelius had proposed.[3] He might even have felt that senatorial approval was inevitable with the support he had from three of the most important senators, namely A. Claudius Pulcher (the princeps senatus), P. Licinius Crassus and P. Mucius Scaevola, and that senatorial discussion was merely a formality that could be bypassed. In any case, it was his right to take his proposal straight to the Concilium Plebis without consulting the senate.[4] Indeed, the bill he wanted passed was no more than a re-enactment of previous laws and his bypassing of the Senate had been preceded by C. Flaminius, whose land law had been carried out in 232 without previous consultation of the Senate.[5] from http://janusquirinus.org/

Similarly, his unprecedented motion, but again hardly illegal,[6] to depose Octavius, a fellow tribune who had vetoed his bill, was likely to be another instance of his urgency and perhaps even impatience at the myopia of those who did not perceive the importance of land reform. It was not an attempt to change the role of the tribunes from protectors of the people against patrician domination into agents of the peoples will,[7] nor was it an attempt to put the Concilium Plebishands even greater responsibility by making the veto of the tribunes capable of being swept aside.[8] These were only, albeit inevitable, secondary results of his actions. from http://janusquirinus.org/

Likewise, his challenge to the Senates previously unchallenged control of finance and foreign affairs through his threat to seize the bequest of Attalus was an inevitable consequence of his urgency to put into effect his land reform bill when faced with the uncompromising attitude of the Senate. In all the above, it is doubtful that any of his actions were meant as direct challenges to the Senate or attempts to change the political system or to become a rex.[9] It is also debatable that it was an attempt by his faction, led by Appius Claudius, to dominatio.[10] Instead, he appeared very concerned with the welfare of Rome and deemed that this could only be achieved through his land reform. from http://janusquirinus.org/

Gaius Gracchus' main concern, too, was the welfare of the Roman state, and any conflict with the Senate, were inevitable side-effects of the more important picture. He was extremely popular among the Roman plebeians, and used this, as well as his oratory talents, to carry out various revolutionary legislations.[11] In addition to reaffirming his brothers agrarian act, he removed whatever limitations Scipio Aemilianus had placed upon the land commissioners, again with the same kind of concern Tiberius had for the situation. He also made provision for the construction of new secondary roads in Italy. This, besides the primary objective of easing travel from the rural areas in order to facilitate the marketing of the produce from the new allotments, also gave employment. He further enacted the foundation of colonies at Tarentum, Capua and some other sites on the Italian peninsula, as well as an overseas colony just outside the site of Carthage (Junonia). The Italian colonies would have helped promote the failing economies of these towns while the colony of Junonia would take advantage of the fertility of the land that had belonged to Carthage. In any case, this colonial law would have gone hand-in-hand with the land allotments to return the impoverished urban Romans to agriculture. To supplement such attempts, his grain law eased the effects of fluctuating grain economy on the needy plebeians. From these, it can be seen that the reforms of Gaius Gracchus are aptly described as philanthropic.[12] from http://janusquirinus.org/

The reforms of Gaius that came into direct conflict with the Senate included his bill attacking the illegal practice by which the Senate had authorized the consul Popillius (132 BCE) to constitute a special tribunal with powers of capital punishment. This bill deemed such an act as an usurpation of the peoples sovereign rights. This was not his inventionit was merely a re-enactment of the traditional view (Polybius vi, 16, 2 as cited by Crawford 1978: 119) that courts capable of passing capital sentences could not be established except by the people.[13] This was an attempt to protect the people, especially in view of the possible supplementary law which precluded senators from misusing judicial powers against the people.[14] His major, and controversial, judiciary law, which abolished senatorial juries and transferred the court to the Equites,[15] brought him again into direct conflict with the Senate. Once more, the motive behind this law was concern for Romes welfare, since this would prevent contemporaries in the Senate acquitting provincial governors who were clearly guilty of extortion. The motive was not that Gaius would beyond doubt have liked to cripple the Senate[16] nor that it would please his wealthy equestrian friends.[17] While it has been argued by some historians that if he had really been concerned with the judicial system, he would have done a lot better had he introduced the Equites into the Senate.[18] Such an action would not have been feasible. As such, he was forced to commit suicide for the extent of his reforms; had he attempted any more, he would not have accomplished anything. In fact, if he had really attempted to introduce the Equites into the Senate, the consequences would have been so devastating that such a move would be accused of being another naïve action of an overzealous reformer by the same historians. from http://janusquirinus.org/

Gaius Gracchus might have also legislated this transfer to ease the class conflict between the senatorial and equestrian classes, which was nearing eruption and causing much social tension. Such an interpretation is in accordance with his move to privatise tax-gathering and put up rights in all the cities of the provinces for auction to the Equites. Some argue that this is a contradiction to his championing the rights of the provincials,[19] but it is more likely that it was another move to appease to Equites. The abuse of the new system which occurred was due to the failure of the Equites to rise to the responsibilities Gaiuslegislation placed upon them,[20] and not due to the policies themselves. from http://janusquirinus.org/

Such inability of the people to rise to the needs of the time was reflected again when the Roman plebeians repeatedly preferred to prolong the brewing Italian problem instead of enfranchising the allies, as proposed by various tribunes, including Gaius, Fulvius Flaccus and the younger Drusus. Even the less drastic measures of Saturninus, who made provisions for allotments to the Latins and Italians who had contributed their full share to Mariusvictories and the conferment of full Roman franchise upon a select number of them[21], was rejected by the Roman urban proletariat. The plebeians also refused to support Sulpicius whose legislature included a bill to distribute the new Roman citizens among the thirty-five pre-existing tribes.[22] from http://janusquirinus.org/

One of the tribunes who proposed the enfranchisement of the Roman allies provides a particularly good example of the use of the tribunate for reformsFulvius Flaccus. Flaccus had actually been a consul, and had, during his consulship, proposed that all allies who wished should receive Roman citizenship while the rest would be given the right of appeal against the Roman magistrates. However, he had been forced to abandon his reforms by the Senate who sent him to Gaul to help Massilia against an attack by the Saluvii.[23] After his consulship, he stepped down from his consular rank to join Gaius in the tribunate in join order to resume his work as a reformer.[24] Again, his concern was for the welfare of the Roman state, because he recognised the threat the displeasure of the allies posed. This example of Flaccus also illustrates the better position the tribunate was in to bring about reformsa tribune, being outside the traditional system of magistracies, was less constrained by it. from http://janusquirinus.org/

Saturninus, as mentioned above, proposed a less drastic version of enfranchising the allies. While Saturninus might have been motivate to a certain extent by personal reasons, such as revenge for the unceremonious and premature termination of his quaestorship, his legislation was nevertheless not meant as direct challenge to senatorial authority but as true social reform. These included the timely reintroduction of Gaiusgrain law during a period of grain shortage, as well as the establishment of the new permanent court, quaestio. The quaestio dealt with the derogation to the majesty of Rome[25] in order to convict Caepio and Mallius for their disastrous campaign against the Northern Germanic tribes. Although it was subsequently abused, it did serve the purpose of ensuring that generals did their best on the battlefield. His use of violence to bring about his legislation in the early part of his tribunate also appears to be due to his recognition that this was the only expedient way to get the Romans to adopt the bitter but necessary remedies. Unfortunately, Saturninus later used violence mainly for personal gains, including political assassinations of would-be opponents.[26] Among these tribune-reformers, he was the only one killed for his personal actions rather than his reforms. from http://janusquirinus.org/

It is true that many of there tribunes, in their actionsneglected to avoid conflicts with the Senate or deviance from tradition, but it can be argued that they did so because they felt that the urgency of the problems superseded the petty concerns for pride and individual benefits. They might even have felt that tradition and/or the attitude of the Senate were the culprit of the poor state Rome was in. This would explain other legislation which directly targeted traditional practices or senatorial authority. Furthermore, many of their drastic decisions, from Tiberiusthreat to seize the bequest of Attalus to Saturninus and Drusususe of force, arose from the uncompromising and myopic attitude of the Senate. Indeed, their drastic actions were probably less harmful to the state than the selfishness of the Senate. from http://janusquirinus.org/

However, in carrying out their reforms, a common and unfortunate outcome is the inevitable placement of legislative responsibility on the urban proletariat through their reforms,[27] such as giving the plebeians unprecedented authority to decide on policies and enabling them to oppose the Senate. Such a placement was not a mistake in itself, but the failure to realise that the plebeians would not be able to recognise the importance of certain policies and rise to the responsibilities was. Indeed, such a placement might have resulted in mob-rule.[28] However, it can be argued that none of these tribunes intended to place such responsibilities on the plebeians. They might have merely used the people as a tool against the Senate and had counted on themselves to make wise and prudent decisions for Rome. They probably also have assumed that their popularity would ensure that their policies would be unopposed by the plebeians. Most likely, their reform programs were terminated before they could come out with an adequate alternative to the traditional government and only because of their premature deaths left the urban proletariat in positions of responsibility. Also, they probably tried to act within certain limits because, had they gone any further, they would have never had the chance to bring about even the smallest change. Indeed, with what has been accused by some historians of inadequate changes, everyone of them, except Saturninus and Sulpicius, was lynched. from http://janusquirinus.org/

At worst, these men were guilty of moving too quickly for the less far-sighted Roman system. It cannot be said that they precipitated the revolution that led to the overthrow of the Republic through challenges to the traditional government of Rome without the creation of any adequate alternative. Instead, the lapse into civil war was primarily because of the very reasons these men used the tribunate to initiate reformsthe Optimatesselfishness in refusing to face the urgent needs of the day, combined with the selfishness of the people.[29] The people brought to nought the reformer-tribunesgenerous plans for Italy as a whole.[30] These tribunes had tried to ease the problems which, if left unsolved, would have led to civil war. It was because the problems were unresolved when these tribunes were lynched and their legislation nullified, that civil war was not prevented. Cicero said of Tiberius his death and indeed earlier the whole conduct of his tribunate divided one people into two parts(Cicero, de re publica i, 31 as cited by Crawford 1978: 112). That would have happened anyway. If these men contributed anything to civil war, they can be considered the spark to set off prematurely what would have been a spontaneous combustion anyway. This is reflected in their assassinations. If their conduct seemed rash and short-sighted, the use of force by the Senate was still less justifiable.[31] Nothing can excuse the barbarity of the methods which it condoned in the brutal agent whom it permitted to apply that force.[32] In a way, their deaths symbolised more the simmering discontent, hatred and violent which they had tried to pacify than results of their actions. from http://janusquirinus.org/

These men used the tribunate for reforms because they recognised the problems Rome faced and because they felt that the tribunate was a better position than a senatorial post or a traditional magistracy to bring about these changes. The reforms these men attempted to bring about would have helped solve the growing problems facing the Roman republic had they not been prevented or annulled by the myopic and die-hard attitudes of the general Roman public and Senate. These reformer-tribunes were not the cause of Romes lapse into civil war. Rather, they were men who had tried to circumvent the cause. from http://janusquirinus.org/

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